Identity Politics in The Campaign Tagline at The 2020 Sumenep Elections

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Abstract

This study wants to find out how the form of identity politics in the campaign tagline in the 2020 Sumenep Pilkada. This research is important to do, considering the messages in the campaign tagline as identity politics in the 2020 Sumenep Pilkada are interesting to study. This study uses a qualitative method. The object of this research is the text and narrative of political campaigns in the taglines "Bismillah Melayani" and "Sumenep Barokah". The results showed that the Sumenep regional election which took place democratically was followed by two pairs of candidates with religious leaders backgrounds, of course, it was a reflection that each of the political parties that carried it really understood the constituent culture, the selection of the taglines "Sumenep Barokah" and "Bismillah Melayani". There are five points in the Sumenep Barokah tagline, namely: First, accelerating, repairing and increasing the infrastructure to support social and economic activities of the community. Second, improving the regional economy, Third, realizing superior human resources. Fourth, create a religious society, and fifth, create good governance. Meanwhile Bismillah Serves on the basis of efforts to facilitate basic needs. Through Bismillah Melayani, religious and service aspects are integrated into the frame of Fauzi-Eva's strength.

Keywords: Identity Politics, Tagline, Pilkada

INTRODUCTION

Admittedly or not, in national political life, Indonesia is still faced with challenges of identity politics. Political attitudes like this are quite effective as weapons for certain groups and organizations to bring down their political opponents (CNN, 2022). This phenomenon is very obvious when the political year is approaching where local political identities continue to spread wildly with tendentious issues. Strengthening identity politics is political behavior that puts forward certain groups or symbols whose purpose is to gain political influence in society (Nasrudin, 2019).

Identity politics can be understood as political dynamics in a democracy, where political aspirations are accommodated in units of community groups affiliated with certain identities (Abdillah, 2012). The problem now is that identity politics, which is being built, overrides ethical and moral politics as a feature of easterners in building a political domain that is polite

and dignified, so that it maintains the integrity of the nation and not the other way around. This is rarely realized by political elites in carrying out the identity political movement for the benefit of obtaining power cake formation from political and economic aspects (Lestari, 2018).

The development of Indonesia's political format seems to have changed its democratic orientation to a prosperous and just format. However, from the observations of experts, democracy that is being built should not be trapped in normative aspects, thereby hindering the more substantive goals of social and political life (Törnquist, 2013). Democracy in Indonesia should not be controlled by a few oligarchic elites who are thirsty for power through political parties trying to accumulate wealth through the election gate (Robinson, R., & Hadiz, 2012; Winters, 2014). The growth and development of post-reform political parties appear to be more pragmatic in building the construction of a party system so as to form a political cartelization machine as a sucker for political and economic resources (Ambardi, 2009; Mietzner, 2008; Slater, 2004).

This condition is an obstacle in democracy, so it is necessary to find a way out, so that the gate of democracy that has become the choice of this nation is in line with the law applicable in Indonesia. While there are factors that congeal their influence on democratic identity politics in Indonesia, this cannot be separated from political actors and the political system itself which opens opportunities for the phenomenon of identity politics to play a role in the principles of democracy in Indonesia (Haboddin, 2012). In addition, identity politics cannot be separated from the candidacy of political parties when selecting candidate cadres before being processed in the election selection. Candidacy is a series of political processes carried out by political parties, namely certification, nomination and submission of candidates (Anam, 2019; Kiftiyah, 2019). In the stages of the candidacy process in electoral politics, the attitude of the right to vote will determine the candidate for the leader. In addition, various divisions of regions into new provinces/cities/districts, and the occurrence of communal movements by giving rise to new conflicts that cannot be separated from identity politics have unknowingly undermined national unity (Nordholt, HS., & Klinken, 2017).

At the national democratic political level, as an illustration in the 2019-2024 Presidential Election with two contestations Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin and Prabowo-Sandi. And at the grassroots level, such as the 2017 DKI Pilkada which greatly sucked up political energy, "Ahok" are two contemporary political phenomena that are clearly very thick and full of identity politics (Idzam Fautanu, Buhori M, 2020). It should also be observed not only in Jakarta, but similar political escalations also occurred in Riau, Kalimantan, Aceh and Papua, along with the strengthening of identity politics in the context of political decentralization (Maarif, 2010).

Political faucets in the name of democracy have begun to be felt since the enactment of Law Number 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Authority, where the emergence of identity politics has become increasingly evident. Just look at the four regions (Riau, Kalimantan, Aceh, and Papua) that the regional political elites have begun to bandage and politicize identity as embryos of power. Among the political elites who were previously eliminated from power are now re-entering the realm of political power and enjoying this power. From that description, the politicization of identity at the local political level is a political fact that must be acknowledged even if it is bitter and undermines national unity. Why is that? There are things

that are difficult to control when the politicization of identity continues to play and damages national values so that it requires awareness of all components of this nation, and solutions are immediately found so that arrangements for power sharing between ethnicities, religions and ethnicities need to be carried out, and we must all be aware that we stand in diversity.

The term identity politics has attracted the attention of academics and observers of socio-political issues in Indonesia, and has even received a special place in recent years. Referring to the writings of Muhtar Haboddin (2012), entitled "The Strengthening of Identity Politics in the Local Area" states that "the strengthening of identity politics at the local level occurs simultaneously with the politics of decentralization. After the stipulation of Law no. 22/1999, the identity politics movement became clearer. In fact, many actors both local and national politics use this issue intensely for power sharing. Historically, identity politics or sects were born in East Java after the research of an American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, who conducted research in East Java in

1950s in a city imaginary referred to as Modjokuto (believed by experts to be Pare, Kediri). The results are contained in the classic master piece book "The Religion of Java" (Javanese Religion), which divides society into categories of santri, abangan, and priyayi. Santri is a Muslim community who adheres to sharia and lives in commercial areas in urban and coastal areas. Abangan are nominal Muslims who only serve as identity on their ID cards but do not practice religious sharia, and the priyayi are an urban middle class group consisting of civil servants and civil servants who are Muslim but are heavily influenced by Javanese syncretism (https://petisi.co/).

Based on these three categories, political preferences are divided into three major political streams, the abangan are affiliated to nationalist parties and are based in the Mataram area, the santri are affiliated to religious parties based in the horseshoe area, and the priyayi are affiliated to political parties. modern. The dissemination of various information content indirectly contributes to the promotion of identity politics. Often, the message to be conveyed hides behind discourses about injustice, discrimination, and partiality to minorities or certain groups.

These narratives continue to be reproduced by targeting the emotional voter segment. In the end, opinion polls were carried out, without any attempt to confirm the main source. If we learn from the previous political momentum, social media is indeed a powerful instrument for driving discourse. Then, what about East Java, where the quantity of social media users is still not evenly distributed in all regions?

In the context of local politics, identity politics carried out by local elites in various regions in Indonesia has been created in such a way and expressed in various forms. Identity politics is used as the basis for the struggle of the local elite in the context of regional expansion and strengthening the identity of the elite in the region as the Son of the Region. Identity politics is transformed into a political entity with the hope of controlling local government until the change of top leadership, in Gerry Van Klinken's terms (in, Haboddin 2012) it is called the local elite who takes over the entire building of local political institutions.

Many have sprung up in various regions in the use of identity politics as part of a political campaign to mobilize the masses to fulfill their interests, such as the Pilkada DKI Jakarta and Pilgub East Java. This becomes a kind of social capital in strengthening its influence and authority in society. Many of the candidates for regent and deputy are "from" the Islamic

boarding school, which marks a strong competition for votes from Islamic boarding schools. General elections are a reflection of the embodiment of democratic principles in modern state governance. According to J. Kristiadi (in Koirudin, 2004) the most essential meaning of general elections for a democratic life is as an institution to carry out changes in power (influence) which are carried out in regulations, norms and ethics so that the circulation of political elites (change of power) can be carried out peacefully. and civilized. Electoral institutions General is a product of human history experience in managing and realizing sovereignty in the hands of the people.

Elections in a democratic country function First, as a procedure for changing power or political positions that are routine; Second, as a mechanism for selecting leaders. Elections are the most appropriate way to find out who is most worthy to be a leader and who is considered capable of representing their interests; Third, as a peaceful conflict resolution so that the change of leadership and articulation of interests can be avoided from violent means, and; Fourth, as a channel for access to power from the community into the circle of power, (Mardimin, 2002).

Therefore, in order to win the competition in the election arena, the contestants of political parties compete with each other by applying various accurate political communication strategies. Political communication strategies carried out by political parties to the community are very necessary in facing a general election. The success of a strategy

Political communication by political parties in planning and implementing, will play a role in the results of political party votes in the election later. Meanwhile, the use of media is very important in the process of campaigning and political socialization in elections. In the context of modern politics, the mass media is not only an integral part of politics, but also has a central position in politics. The mass media is a political communication channel that is widely used for the purpose of disseminating information, becoming a forum for public discussion and articulating the demands of various communities. All of this is due to the nature of the mass media that can transport information and images massively and reach audiences that are so far away, diverse, and widely dispersed (Pawito, 2009). The regional head election in Sumenep Regency in 2020 was participated by two pairs of regent candidates and deputy regent candidates, namely; Ahmad Fauzi-Hj. Dewi Khalifah (supported by PDIP,PAN, Gerindera, PKS and PBB) and Fattah Jasin-Ali Fikri (PKB, PPP, Democrat, Nasdem, Hanura, Golkar, and Gelora). Each pair came from the Islamic boarding school, namely KH. Ali Fikri, the caretaker of the Annuqayah Guluk-Guluk Sumenep Islamic boarding school as a candidate for deputy regent, then Nyai Hj. Dewi Khalifah as a candidate for deputy regent, as well as the caretaker of the Aqidah Usmuni Terate Sumenep Islamic boarding school. The use of symbols of identity politics is very visible in the process of placing a partner on each of the nominated candidates. The symbol of religious identity in the political arena in Madura is indeed quite capable of attracting elites in gaining political party electability considering that the Madura area is an area that thrives with cottage institutions boarding school.

Picture 1. contestant pair

Therefore, the use of identity political symbols will always be reflected in party political behavior, the use of political campaign taglines in the dynamics of the Pilkada in Sumenep 2020 in the form of "Sumenep Barokah" and "Bismillah Melayani" is also part of the use of elite political symbols in winning electability. party in the contest arena. During the implementation of the political campaign in the regional head elections in Sumenep, from the beginning the tagline had emerged as a political campaign tool in the 2020 simultaneous regional elections. Based on the above phenomenon, this study presents a study by analyzing identity politics in the tagline of the 2020 Sumenep regional election campaign, namely the use of the campaign taglines "Sumenep Barokah" and "Bismillah Melayani".

METHOD

This paper uses qualitative research methods with descriptive analysis techniques. As for the data collection techniques through field studies and online data collection. The field study was conducted by tracing source documents relevant to the research, such as billboards, Benares and online social media regarding political communication during the campaign period and identity politics, especially in the Pilkada of Sumenep Regency. The object of this research is the text and narrative of political campaigns in the taglines "Bismillah Melayani" and "Sumenep Barokah".

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The birth of identity politics from social groups who until now feel intimidated and discriminated against by the domination of central power when running the wheels of government. This is what later became the basis for the birth of identity politics in the state. According to Cressida J. Hayes (2007) identity politics appears in a broader understanding is the reality of injustice from certain social groups so that it interprets it as a momentary political movement that is tougher by pushing the power of certain ethnicities. Heller and Punsher (1995) explain the characteristics of identity politics as nothing but a political movement that directs its attention to differences that feel superior to others and packaged in the main political categories to suppress legitimate government. Whereas in the view of Abdillah S, Ubed (2002)

identity politics is a firm attitude in determining who is included and who refuses, so that it is clear in making decisions that do not change.

In the context of democracy in Indonesia, with the emergence of identity politics, this is a political dynamic because they live in a pluralism of nations which cannot be separated from the existence of injustice and equal rights claimed by each identity of a certain social group. Therefore, the existence of differences is the basis and measure in calling for identity politics in Indonesia so that they reinforce these differences. If this political conflict is not immediately anticipated by state administrators, it is feared that it will cause social friction in the deeper grassroots realm, thereby creating a wider space for conflict and will create state instability.

According to Klaus Von Beyme (in Abdillah, 2010), there are three character traits in identity politics, namely building a grand narrative and rejecting development results from legitimate government by developing a theory to drive biological factors in social culture towards differences as a reality of life. in society. Their political movements have always been tendentious to build an inverted apartheid system, and the lack of identity bearers has always made this group rely on the theory of sensitivity to certain cases for the interests of their group.

Indonesia is a country that is the territory of the silk route, various ethnic groups live in this equatorial country, both from outside and within the country itself. One of the ethnic groups that dominates the country is the Chinese ethnicity. Historically, the Chinese entered Indonesia in 206 BC – 220 AD through trade routes. The Chinese came along with the expeditions made by Admiral Cheng Ho seven times (Yuanzi, 2005). The formation of identity can be formed either partially or interactively. This is what will give birth to socio-economic, socio-political, social and socio-cultural changes. Ethnic identity and religion are two things that are elements of social change. The process of religious identity politics will have a direct or indirect impact on social change and vice versa (Sukamto, 2010). Meanwhile, the existence of ethnicity identity politics also directly or indirectly, real or implicitly creates social change. It is no exception that the formation, naming and use of identities also give rise to social change. The occurrence of interrelation between identity and social change is as something contradictory, either hidden or openly between citizens, public bodies and markets3. The application and actualization of identity in a person may reflect or represent himself or institutions in the context of ethnicity, the formation of Javanese, Madurese, Balinese, Chinese, Arabic and so on; in the context of religion occurs in Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Tridharma or Khong Hu Chu.

Identity in a person can also represent institutions, be it ethnicity, religion and nationality (Sukamto, 2010). 3 It is these three great forces that dominantly color the reality of everyday life; citizens refer to on the one hand individuals and on the other hand the community, but more emphasis is placed on those who do not have the role of public bodies or market players; public body is a representation of the state which was previously tasked with realizing the welfare state; market is market players, conglomerates, both individuals and business entities; the problem is that the occurrence of an affair between them can damage the relationship between the two of the three great powers.

Theoretically, identity politics according to Lukmantoro is politics to prioritize the interests of members of a group because they have the same identity or characteristics, whether based on race, ethnicity, gender, or religion. Identity politics is another formulation of the

politics of difference. Identity politics is a political action with efforts to channel aspirations to influence policies, mastery over the distribution of values that are considered valuable to the most fundamental demands, namely self-determination on the basis of primordialism. In the ethnic format, identity politics is reflected from efforts to incorporate values into regional regulations, separating government areas, the desire to land special autonomy until the emergence of the separatist movement. Meanwhile, in the religious context, identity politics is reflected in various efforts to include religious values in the policy-making process, including the implementation of sharia regional regulations, as well as efforts to make a city synonymous with a particular religion.

Meanwhile, Cressida Heyes defines identity politics as a sign of political activity (Cressida Heyes, 2007). Meanwhile, in a broader sense, identity politics has an interest in liberation from situations of marginalization, which specifically includes the constituency (membership) of groups in a broader context. If we look closely, identity politics is actually another name for biopolitics which talks about a group identified by biological characteristics. or its biological purposes from a point of view. An example is race politics and gender politics. (Hellner, 1994). According to Agnes Heller, identity politics is a political movement that focuses its attention on difference as a major political category. Identity politics arises from individual awareness to elaborate on particular identities, in the form of relations within ethnic and religious primordial identities. However, in the next journey, identity politics was actually hijacked and embraced by the majority group to establish the domination of power.

The use of identity politics to gain power, which actually exacerbates differences and encourages conflict, does not mean that it does not attract sharp criticism. Identity politics seems to reinforce the essentialistic wholeness of the existence of certain social groups based on primordial identification. Agnes Heller defines identity politics as a political concept and movement that focuses attention on difference as a major political category (Abdilah S, 2002). In every community, even though they share a common ideology and goals, it cannot be denied that there are various kinds of individuals who have their own personalities and identities.

So in general the general theory of identity politics and various research results show, there are two main factors that make ethnicity and religion attractive and salient to be used and influential in the political process. First, when ethnicity and religion become factors at stake. There is a kind of need to maintain or defend the identity of a group. Second, when the political process takes place in a competitive manner. That is, the political process

causing identity groups to face each other and no one is dominant, so it is not clear who will be the winner long ago. General elections, including pilkada, are political processes in which various factors such as identity are at stake. It remains only now how the actors involved in it manage issues such as ethnicity and religion, which is at stake.

We can see an illustration of how the portrait of identity politics can be seen in the implementation of the 2017 DKI Pilkada, a portrait that shows where identity politics tends to lead to issues of ethnicity, religion and race. The role of ethnicity, religion and

race plays a very strong role and even crystallizes in such a way that it puts psychological pressure on the electorate. Such a political process, whether we realize it or not, will undermine democratization in Indonesia. Seeing this phenomenon, it is undeniable that another thing that also needs to be examined is the problem of micropolitics, namely the relations of power in the practice of daily life claim to be a regime of truth that is managed in a structured manner and is included by arousing people's emotions so that marginalization occurs until the emergence of label "the other", such as; religious differences, gender differences, ethnic differences etc.

In fact, the success of implementing identity politics in DKI in the 2017 regional elections has become a raw model for several regions, including in the Madura region, especially the Sumenep district, in the 2020 regional elections by using identity politics as the main foundation for each contestant to win formal and informal political battles. Parties are no longer a representation and vessel as well as a tool for consolidation processes and communication. The domination of identity politics in the public sphere which is happening every day with such big waves on social media is not something to be celebrated, because it seems that social media has also contributed to the occurrence of increasingly widening social segression. The practice of democracy in Indonesia seems to have turned into a race that knows no friends or foes, all of which are carried out in an oligarchic democracy which is very familiar with racial and divisive politicization. The sentiment towards ethnic minorities that has occurred up to now could be social engineering conceptualized by certain groups. to attract public sympathy

The danger of excessive identity politics is that it can lead to fascism, even worse, namely separatism and a society that has been assimilated based on a certain identity, can be easily mobilized by groups that want to achieve their political agenda. Identity politics carried out by certain groups seeks to create a mono-identity state. The Indonesian people seem to have lost their memory of the history of the diversity they have. In short, identity politics cannot be fought with "softer" identity politics. It must be fought with politics that prioritizes public interests above personal interests. Another thing that also needs to be addressed is that religion should not be brought into the political sphere. Religion is sufficient as a life belief and moral guide, both in the individual and social realms, because religious teachings emphasize faith, rituals of worship, and morality. and ethnicity for the sake of political interests, then what happens is the politicization of religion which has the potential for horizontal communal violence, and as a result the spirit of democracy that the people's power had struggled for in 1998 will be in vain. On the other hand, the role of religious leaders from both Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism must simultaneously direct their followers not to be trapped in the politicization of religion carried out by certain groups in order to fulfill their political lust for power. In order to clarify how to understand the two political campaign messages that became the taglines of the two pairs of candidates for regent and deputy regent of Sumenep, researchers need to map out the analogy to be clearer.

a. **Identity Politics in the Tagline of the Fattah Jasin-Ali Fikir Couple Campaign "Sumenep Barokah".**

Picture 2. Candidate Pair with Serial Number 02

"Sumenep Barokah" is the grand vision and mission of the candidate for regent and deputy regent, RB Fattah Jasin and KH. Mohammad Ali Fikri A. Warits at the 2020 Regional Head Election. Sumenep Barokah's vision is to prosper the village, and equalize development. While the mission there are five points. First, accelerating, repairing and enhancing the infrastructure to support social and economic activities of the community. Second, improving the regional economy through optimizing local potential. Third, realizing superior human resources in various fields. Fourth, create a religious society, and fifth, create good governance (Sumenep Regency KPU data, 2021).

As a sign, the tagline above was written in a conscious state and in a certain context, the election battle and the struggle for votes. The above taqline is also present in a

a society that has a certain culture (say the Sumenep community which is known as the santri base). So the diction chosen and the phrase framed need to be selected, because they want to represent the candidate's (policies) as religiously with the voters who want to be used as ballots. This is why then "Bismillah" and "Barokah" were chosen, dictions that are practically familiar to the students.

The meaning in the tagline above is certainly different from "Bismillah" which is said when we eat. The diction "blessing" is also different from the meaning of prayer, for example, what a teacher and student say, "may your knowledge be blessed, son". So, referring to Sausure's opinion above, "signifier" can be the same but "signifier" can be different.

The ideology of the candidates who carry the taqline that looks religious, especially if it presents other signs as described above, is very visible as a supporter of developmentalism (developmentalism). An ideology that opens the door as wide as possible to the market, aka investment friendly, without thinking that it will further marginalize its people, one of which is marked by the release of people's land which has been converted into development along the coast (and will soon expand not only on the edge, but also on the coast). to the Middle). Serving who? Blessing for whom?

Well, the religious-looking taqline above lays out what Jean Baudrillard calls hyperreality, where the illusion and the real are difficult to identify. In fact, the power of

hyperreality lies in its power to distort the illusory rather than as illusory. Power in practice always plays this hyperreality to support its social system, economic structure, and ideology at the same time.

b. Identity Politics in the Fauzi-Eva Couple Campaign Tagline "Bismillah Melayani"

Picture 3. Candidate Pair with Serial Number 01

While the pair of candidates for regent and deputy regent, Ach. Fauzi and Dewi Khalifah adopted the tagline "Bismillah Melayani", this jargon was carried out on the basis of an effort to facilitate basic needs. Through Bismillah Melayani, religious and service aspects are integrated into the frame of Fauzi-Eva's strength. In this case, it does not only promise prosperity, which is commonly expressed by the average candidate. However, it is more of a service that is a basic need of the community. The availability of adequate hospitals and transportation in the archipelago, for example, the quality of human resources and the welfare of teachers, including the Koran teachers in Islamic boarding schools and mosques. As well as the fate of the farmers, Fauzi-Eva will ensure that the farmers will receive good service, especially in terms of fighting for the price of the farmers' crops, (Sumenep Regency KPU Data, 2021).

Because the tagline was made in the context of the election contest and the struggle for votes, the context is important to understand the meaning. That is, the taqline is presented at a certain time and with a certain purpose and purpose. So taqline is a political act to achieve political interests as well. Of course the taqline is full of political veils, where one side represents what is to be said, but the other side keeps what is not wanted to be said.

It is important then that we uncover the veil of the taqline so that what is not said becomes clear. Including uncovering the ideological cover behind it.

The question that can be asked is, is it true that a candidate whose taqline is "Bismillah Melayani" will always place God as the beginning and the point of departure for all his policies later? Or who do you really want to serve? Oligarchy? Carrying the name of God with a different purpose is certainly a very big risk. Because even God has broken his promise, let alone His creatures.

CONCLUSION

Departing from the phenomenon in the use of campaign taglines in the Sumenep regional election 2020, as has been explained above, we can draw a common thread, that when it comes to politics, Sumenep is one of the regions that has just carried out the Pilkada in 2020. It is an interesting discourse to study because during this new decade the party that has a nationalist symbol is the winner in the 2020 Sumenep Regional Head Election. This does not mean that identity politics is starting to fade, but on the contrary, religious discourses are not only played by politicians who come from a religious party. Now, identity politics can be played by anyone, given its significant influence and bargaining power. Sumenep 2020 cannot be separated from the struggles of religious figures, specifically Islam. These figures not only serve as a place for consultations but also take part in providing information to lead the masses and even openly accompany each candidate in the pulpits and political stages to campaign. From the results of this study it can be concluded as follows, namely; first, the use of the campaign tagline for the candidate pair Fattah Jasin-Ali Fikri by carrying "Sumenep"

Barokah" and "Bismillah Melayani" are forms of taglines and political communication messages containing Islamic elements. The results showed that the Sumenep regional election which took place democratically was followed by two pairs of candidates with religious leaders' backgrounds, of course, it was a reflection that each of the political parties that carried it really understood the constituent culture, the selection of the taglines "Sumenep Barokah" and "Bismillah Melayani". There are five points in the Sumenep Barokah tagline, namely: First, accelerating, repairing and increasing the infrastructure to support social and economic activities of the community. Second, improving the regional economy, Third, realizing superior human resources. Fourth, create a religious society, and fifth, create good governance. Meanwhile Bismillah Serves on the basis of efforts to facilitate basic needs. Through Bismillah Melayani, religious and service aspects are integrated into the frame of Fauzi-Eva's strength.

Therefore, without us realizing it, the politicization of religion actually indirectly degrades political values and religion itself. The suggestion that the writer wants to convey here is that the KPU and Bawaslu Election Organizers should work together to make consistent regulations to comply with the regulations made so as not to cause obstacles or problems. This includes trying to avoid using political sentences or campaigns that smell like religious dogmas. There needs to be awareness from each individual and group towards religious elites and volunteers, sympathizers, political consultants to be wiser in terms of religion and politics, including interested political elite figures so that they can embody religious and political issues to the king who puts more emphasis on substance and performance.

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