

## Divergence of State Concepts in Online Media: A Comparative Study of *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Salam* Perspective by Religious Organization

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### Abstract

This research examines the contestation of Muslim religious patterns in Indonesia, especially on social media. Contestation of the meaning of the state or state system from an Islamic perspective is echoed by extreme and moderate Islam. Extreme-conservative religious patterns tend to interpret democracy as a product of infidels and a political game of chameleons, even thagut. A moderate Islamic camp supports the democratic system on the grounds that it is for the benefit of citizens who are not only Muslims. The data objects studied in this article were taken from @almanhaj. or.id, @safaridakwah, www.almanhaj.or.id and @ulama.nusantara, @nahdlatululama, www.nu.or.id. The research method used in this study was qualitative, using literature studies and processing data objects taken from social media channels and websites. The identity of this article is also a media/netnography study, whose processing process begins with collecting data (virtual observation), which is then analyzed and processed using Teun A. Van Dijk's discourse analysis theory, which consists of text, social cognition, and social context. Finally, this article concludes that the concept of the true and ideal state from extremes is the caliphate system and the enforcement of Islamic law in the state against anyone, regardless of any religious background known as dar al-islam. In contrast to moderates, who interpret democracy as a good state concept to be applied in multi-religious Indonesia known as Dar al-Salam. This view of moderates cannot be separated from Prophet's command, namely, in the state to emphasize the benefits for all groups. The theoretical implication in this study is that the state system built and narrated in the digital space by Muslims has two poles, namely the Islamic state "dar al-islam" and the prosperous, peaceful state "Dar al-salam." The discovery of these two major concepts is an academic contribution resulting from the study of the meaning of the state in the digital space by religious organizations in Indonesia. Thus, this study provides benefits for future researchers in developing Islamic studies and statehoods from an Islamic perspective.

**Keywords:** Contestation, Religious Patterns, Indonesia, Social Media, State System.

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## INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is a country that adheres to the jargon of different but one "*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*". However, in recent years Indonesia has been faced with problems that require serious handling, namely related to religion, especially Islam. Contemporary Islam is now an interesting spectacle that must be observed, because the unity and unity of Indonesia seems to have a serious challenge with the emergence of religious diversity so that conflicts in Indonesia are always colored on the basis of religion, such as the Ambon conflict, Sampang, and bombings of places of worship in various places.<sup>1</sup> Such things do not stop at social problems as above, but such things penetrate into an unhealthy state system. Given that in the contestation of the state, it is common for there to be differences of opinion.<sup>2</sup>

In the midst of national life with the identity of freedom of opinion and expression, it is an opportunity for the colors of religious patterns to become increasingly diverse. This also includes looking at the state system that reaps pros and cons.<sup>3</sup> Likewise, in the midst of the plurality of Indonesia with a Muslim majority, the polarization of the meaning of the state that is appropriately applied in this country is multi-interpreted and diverse. Of course this is a problem that can be divisive if left without a damper. Claims to the truth of the state system that is in accordance with Islam are experiencing increasingly intense contestation, especially on social media as a second communication base in the modern era.

One side of the group states that it leans towards purification, and the other group leans towards dynamism and flexibility in Islam. The two major camps in viewing the state system are interesting to study further in order to find out how the state system is in accordance with the Islamic spirit and does not deviate from the noble values of Islam itself.

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<sup>1</sup> Muhammad Takdir, M. Musthafa & Rozinah AS, "The Dynamics of Religious Conflict in Indonesia: Contestation and Resolution of Religious Conflicts in The New Order Age", *Al-Adyan: Journal of Religious Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2021), 103.

<sup>2</sup> D. Pertiwi, et. al, "Mengulik Konsep Negara Menurut Pemikir Islam Periode Klasik, Pertengahan, dan Modern", *Jurnal Hukum dan Politik Islam* (2021), 15.

<sup>3</sup> Affan Akbar, et. al, "Perkembangan Demokrasi di Indonesia", *Advances in Social Humanities Research*, Vol. 1 No. 5 (2023), 13.

However, before that it is important to find an empty study gap in this article to present previous research as a comparison. Some previous research helps to position this article to more specifically examine the research in question. As some of the research results are as follows: Saepullah S in his article "The Concept of the State in the Perspective of Islamic Political Thought: An Examination of the Concept of Caliphate and Salafi (*Konsep Negara dalam Perspektif Pemikiran Politik Islam: Telaah atas Konsep Kbilafah dan Salafi*)",<sup>4</sup> this article examines specifically and theoretically the concept of the caliphate Islamic state. The author highlights the concept of the caliphate state adopted by Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran as examples. The concept of kfilafah referred to in Saepullah's writing is a state whose constitutional and governance system is based on the mechanism of Islamic rules.

Then Amin Farih in his writing "The Consistency of Nahdlatul Ulama in Maintaining Pancasila and the Sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in the Middle of the Islamic State Discourse (*Konsistensi Nahdlatul Ulama dalam Mempertahankan Pancasila dan Kedaulatan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia di Tengah Wacana Negara Islam*)"<sup>5</sup> Farih only highlights the consistency of Nahdlatul Ulama in narrating Pancasila in accordance with the principles of Islamic values. This paper arises because of the imbalance of the definition of the Islamic state which is widely debated in academic forums and in the midst of social life by various groups of certain organizations.

The research results of Siti Fatjhiyatul Jannah and M. Arif Affandi "State Discourse between Nahdlatul Ulama and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in East Java (*Diskursus Negara antara Nahdlatul Ulama dan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia di Jawa Timur*)"<sup>6</sup>, this article highlights the comparison of the concept of state from the perspective of Nahdlatul Ulama and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia which have different concepts. NU embraces true independence and democracy, while HTI leans towards the concept of

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<sup>4</sup> Saefullah S, "Konsep Negara dalam Perspektif Pemikiran Politik Islam: Telaah atas Konsep Khilafah dan Salafi", *Al-Qisthas: Jurnal Hukum dan Politik*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2017), 102.

<sup>5</sup> Amin Farih, "Konsistensi Nahdlatul Ulama dalam Mempertahankan Pancasila dan Kedaulatan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia di Tengah Wacana Negara Islam", *JPW; Jurnal Politik Walisongo*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2019), 1-20.

<sup>6</sup> Siti Fatkhiyatul Jannah & M. Arif Affandi, "Diskursus Negara antara Nahdlatul Ulama dan Hizbut Tahrir di Indonesia di Jawa Timur", *Jurnal Paradigma*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2013), 1.

khilafah in narrating the concept of a state that is in accordance with Islam. Then the results of Muhamad Ikhsan Mardani's research "The Concept of the Islamic State According to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Darul Islam Movement (DI) in the Perspective of Siyasaah Syar'iyah (*Konsep Negara Islam Menurut Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Dan Gerakan Darul Islam (DI) dalam Perspektif Siyasaah Syar'iyah*)"<sup>7</sup> the results of this study are not much different from the article written by Jannah et al, that uses comparative studies with similar study results.

Said Romadlan examines the "Pancasila State Discourse among Muhammadiyah (*Diskursus Negara Pancasila di Kalangan Muhammadiyah*)",<sup>8</sup> this article focuses on the process of understanding or interpretation of Muhammadiyah as a progressive Islamic organization on Pancasila as the basis of the state. The understanding of Pancasila as the basis of the state is important in the midst of strengthening the flow of transnational ideologies that want to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia (khilafah) and replace the Pancasila state foundation with Islam. The study results show that the process of understanding Pancasila is based on the language (verse) of the Qur'an letter Saba' verse 15 "*baladun thayyibatun wa rabbun ghafur*", which is a good country and is in the forgiveness of Allah. In the process of language distantiation into discourse, the verse is interpreted by Muhammadiyah as the Pancasila State. Furthermore, the Pancasila State through the distantiation of discourse into textuality is understood by Muhammadiyah as *darul abdi wa syahadah* (the state of consensus and testimony). Muhammadiyah's understanding of the Pancasila State can be used as a counter-discourse to the efforts of Islamist groups to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.

Then Yeni Sri Lestari in her research "Identity Politics in Indonesia: Between Nationalism and Religion (*Politik Identitas di Indonesia: Antara Nasionalisme dan Agama*)", this research examines how identity politics occurs in Indonesia. The focus of the object under study is two identities which include religious groups and nationalist

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<sup>7</sup> Muhamad Ikhsan Mardani, "Konsep Negara Islam Menurut Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) dan Gerakan Darul Islam (DI) dalam Perspektif Siyasaah Syar'iyah", (Skripsi—UIN Sunan Gunung Djati, Bandung, 2023).

<sup>8</sup> Said Romadlan, "Diskursus Negara Pancasila di Kalngan Muhammadiyah", *Sospol: Jurnal Sosial Politik*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2020), 1-15.

groups.<sup>9</sup> This research theme has previously examined how political contestation in the digital media space as its spread in the current millennial era. Similar research was conducted by Zainut Tauhid Sa'adi in his dissertation which was tested on August 5, 2021 at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, with the title "Contestation of the Political Ideology of the Indonesian Islamic Movement in the Digital Public Space (*Kontestasi Ideologi Politik Gerakan Islam Indonesia di Ruang Publik Digital*)". In it, he identifies political contestation in the digital media website and social media of the Islamic movement with the objects of study, namely FPI (Front Pembela Islam), HTI (Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia), Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama.<sup>10</sup>

From the results of the search for previous research above, some examine the state system of one religious organization such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, there are also efforts to compare how the state system echoed by NU, HTI and Salafi, even the political contestation of NU-Muhammadiyah and FPI in the digital space of the contemporary era. So as a differentiator, this article seeks to take a deeper look at how the perspective of Nahdlatul Ulama-Muhammadiyah as a moderate organization and Salafi-Wahabi-HTI in interpreting the state, especially in the digital space. The two poles of views on the state between *dar al-islam* and *Dar al-salam* are interesting to be studied further to add to the treasures of social religious academic studies in the current digital era.

Therefore, the formulation of problems that are important to study include: how is religious ideology in Indonesia? How is digital space used as a space for religious ideology? How is the polarization of the meaning of the state by moderate and extreme groups in the digital space. The main purpose of writing this article is not only to know the religious ideology in Indonesia and the contestation of ideological wars in the digital space, but also to know how to counter opinions about the state in accordance with Islam which consists of two major poles, known as *dar al-islam* and *Dar al-salam*. It is none other than how both are echoed to achieve the goal of spreading the ideology of each group of religious organizations.

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<sup>9</sup> Yeni Sri Lestari, "Politik Identitas di Indonesia: Antara Nasionalisme dan Agama", *Jurnal of Politics and Policy*, Vol 1, No. 1 (Desember 2018), 19-29.

<sup>10</sup> "Disertasi Zainut Tauhid Sa'adi di UIN Syarif Hidayatullah", <https://minanews.net/disertasi-zainut-tauhid-saadi-di-uin-syarif-hidayatullah/>, (diakses pada 22 Desember 2023).

## METHOD

Qualitative research is the approach used in this research. In Saryono and Aggraeni's view, qualitative is used in describing, investigating, discovering and explaining the features of social influences that are difficult to describe, measure, and explain quantitatively.<sup>11</sup> Given that the object of research is closely related to humanism and religious phenomena. With its characteristics that are more humanist and try to explore the phenomena of religious social life and are natural, from here researchers can seek truth from the public or the context under study.<sup>12</sup> As with the theme of this study, which explores the polarization of the meaning of the state in social media, it illustrates that the flow of inter-religious interactions can also take place without meeting face to face.

Data sources are sorted into two, namely primary and secondary: Primary data in this article is in the form of literature studies, data in the form of images, video recordings, writings sourced from social media, especially on websites and Instagram. The website of the extreme group is represented by [almanhaj.or.id](http://almanhaj.or.id), while the Moderate group data sources are taken from [www.nu.or.id](http://www.nu.or.id) and [muhammadiyah.or.id](http://muhammadiyah.or.id). While data sourced from Instagram is taken from [@safari\\_dakwah](https://www.instagram.com/safari_dakwah), [@gemapembasanjatim](https://www.instagram.com/gemapembasanjatim), [@gema\\_uinjakarta](https://www.instagram.com/gema_uinjakarta), and [@almanhaj.or.id](https://www.instagram.com/almanhaj.or.id) accounts representing extreme groups, while the Moderate Islamic group through [@nahdlatululama](https://www.instagram.com/nahdlatululama) [@ulama.nusantara](https://www.instagram.com/ulama.nusantara) and [@lensamu](https://www.instagram.com/lensamu) accounts. Meanwhile, secondary data comes from pre-existing data and its position is below primary data. In this article in the form of scientific articles, academic final assignments, and other supporting sources.

The data collection techniques in this article are as follows: 1. First with a literature study that focuses on the theme of this research. Apart from functioning as the first starting point for compiling a research design (research framework), it also utilizes literature sources in order to compile the theme under study. Media studies on the official Instagram accounts of Radical / Extreme Islamic groups, namely [@safari\\_dakwah](https://www.instagram.com/safari_dakwah), [@gemapembasanjatim](https://www.instagram.com/gemapembasanjatim), [@gema\\_uinjakarta](https://www.instagram.com/gema_uinjakarta), and [@almanhaj.or.id](https://www.instagram.com/almanhaj.or.id), and the official Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah accounts of Moderate Islamic

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<sup>11</sup> Saryono, Mekar Dwi Anggraeni, *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif dan Kuantitatif dalam Bidang Kesehatan*, (Yogyakarta : Nuha Medika, 2013), 49.

<sup>12</sup> Lexy J. Moleong, *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif*, (Bandung: PT Remaja Rosdakarya, April 2017), 4

groups @nahdlatululama @ulama.nusantara. Similarly, the website addresses of Extreme Islam are [almanhaj.or.id](http://almanhaj.or.id), and Moderate Islam groups at [www.nu.or.id](http://www.nu.or.id) and [muhammadiyah.or.id](http://muhammadiyah.or.id).

Data analysis in this study is: First, by reducing the data. That is by re-analyzing by sharpening, classifying, selecting relevant data related to sources or important information about the theme of this research. Second, after the data is classified and selected, it is then analyzed in the form of narratives using Teun A. Van Dijk's discourse analysis theory (text, social cognition, and social context) which can form a series of information that is easily accepted by academics and has meaning according to the topic of this study. Third, based on the narrative structure that has been formulated in the previous step, then a conclusion can be drawn in this research as a form of answer to the topic of the problem. Fourth, the researcher conducted a re-examination of the research results. This is done to measure how relevant and accurate the results of the object under study are, so that later there will be no misunderstanding of the interpretation of the data obtained through document studies and literature studies so that the focus of the study can be deepened.

## **RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

### ***Islamic Religious Ideology in Indonesia***

In recent years, Islam has become a hot topic of discussion among its adherents in various parts of the world. They even claim the truth of Islam itself. Especially in Indonesia with the presence of democracy, the understanding of Islamic practices becomes a very fundamental spectacle, where many social problems are colored by religious problems. While religion itself becomes a difference so that they claim the truth of each. This is in line with Hendro Puspito's statement in defining religion, which is a value system that regulates human relationships and the universe related to beliefs. Minister of Religious Affairs Yaqut Cholil Qoumas said that the majority of Muslims in Indonesia agree with the ideology of Pancasila. He conveyed this when giving a speech in an online discussion entitled "Understanding Indonesian Muslims Culture" which was held on Saturday, March 13, 2021. In general, Indonesian Muslims

consider that the position of religion is very important to their lives. The Minister of Religious Affairs referred to a survey conducted in 2020.<sup>13</sup>

The survey said that as many as 98 percent of Muslims in Indonesia thought that religion was important to their lives. According to Yaqut, this figure is higher than countries in the Middle East. He further explained that Muslims in Indonesia hold moderate views and agree with the ideology of Pancasila. It is proven that 81.6 percent of Indonesian Muslims agree with Pancasila. On the same occasion, Yaqut also revealed that in 2010 Indonesia contributed 13.07 percent of the world's Muslim population. This number is greater than Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Then, nationally, the proportion of the Muslim population in Indonesia is 87.2 percent of the total population in the country. The percentage is equivalent to 227 million people. In terms of islands, the majority of the Muslim population is on the islands of Java and Sumatra. Then in terms of social religious organizations, the majority of Muslims in Indonesia are affiliated with Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. As many as 59.2 percent of Indonesian Muslims are affiliated with NU and 10.6 percent are affiliated with Muhammadiyah. And the rest are scattered in other organizations.<sup>14</sup>

So that we are currently faced with three religious content/traditions in Islam, where in Indonesia there are those who carry religion in the context of Arabic culture, then Western culture, and local culture. So that from here there are many frictions or clashes in claiming which Islam is the most correct. Likewise, the mutual claims of the truth of Islam above, cannot be separated from the belief that what they embrace-the way of Islam-is the most correct. Such as the use of the veil and beard. If not, it is considered un-Islamic and many other things that claim the symbols of Islam that they adhere to are the most correct.<sup>15</sup>

Like the Old Order (*Orde Lama*), which was then led by Sokarno, Islamic political movements began to emerge, such as Darul Islam with its mission to form an Islamic State of Indonesia. However, this subsided when the Muhammadiyah and NU

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<sup>13</sup> Kompas, "Menag Sebut Mayoritas Muslim Indonesia Setuju dengan Pancasila", (diakses pada 12 Februari 2023), link: <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/03/13/11584391/menag-sebut-mayoritas-muslim-indonesia-setuju-dengan-pancasila>

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Chafid Wahyudi, "Tipologi Islam Moderat dan Puritan: Pemikiran Khaled M. Abou el-Fadl", *Teosofi: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Juni 2011, 76.



organizations rejected it. Even the Masyumi party also rejected it. Then when (1967-1885) the New Order which was still less effective in rolling Islamization in the archipelago. This stems from the intimidation of the government at that time.

Therefore, *Darul Islam* (under the guise of radicalism) returned to the surface with its proud jargon "*Jihad*" which also secretly moved underground under the leadership of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir under the pseudonym "*Usrah*" which spread from the Bandung area to other cities in 1978. Only when entering (1986-1997) the second half of the New Order was there a change in it, namely the government allowed Islamic ideology to blend in the political corridor.<sup>16</sup> Entering the post-Reformation era, democracy and a climate of openness emerged, which at that time received a serious threat marked by the presence of religious and ethnic conflicts. Many people reflected on the assessment of Indonesian Islamic modernism, which was then in a democratic position which was then accompanied by (Political Islam) Islamist groups that began to emerge.<sup>17</sup>

These differences are classified into several Islamic camps that are also widely spread in Indonesia. As in the writing of Joko Tri Haryanto quoted by Ramli Abdul Wahib, that in addition to the major sects that have developed such as Sunni, Mu'tazilah and Shia,<sup>18</sup> especially in Indonesia is a fertile field in forming or growing micro Islamic sects. However, before going far in this regard, it is interesting to understand first about the problem of modernity and tradition whose impact can now be felt. Regarding this, it departs from Muhammad 'Abid Al-Jabiri's question in Chafid Wahyudi's writing, namely - do we still have a choice to modernity.<sup>19</sup> Tradition here is part of the past that exists today so that it is in dialog / protocol with modernity. Thus, it is possible to grow ambivalence which then one day can lead to a discourse of awakening.

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<sup>16</sup> Kunawi Basyir, "Ideologi Gerakan Politik Islam di Indonesia", *Al-Tabrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam*, Vol. 16, No. 2, November 2016, 347-348.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 353.

<sup>18</sup> Ramli Abdul Wahid, "Aliran Minoritas dalam Islam di Indonesia", *Journal of Contemporary and Muslim Societies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Juli-Desember 2017, 157-158.

<sup>19</sup> Wahyudi, "Tipologi Islam Moderat dan Puritan", 76.

We can know that this group can be said or described as militant, radical, extremist, fundamentalist, jihadist and fanatic.<sup>20</sup> However, Abou Fadl's view prefers to use the nickname puritan, which means that it is intolerant of many different points of view and tends to use violence / coercion in the reality of its preaching. We can find puritan-intolerant groups represented by Wahabi-Salafi Islamic organizations, the Front Pembela Islam, HTI, Ikhwanul Muslimin and similar groups. Such as the case when FPI on January 30, 1999 after the grand tabligh in Yogyakarta which carried out attacks and riots.<sup>21</sup>

With doctrines and calls for jihad or returning everything to Islamic texts, this kind of Islamic group or typology is in the spotlight, especially in Indonesia and is often referred to as radical or classified as terrorists.<sup>22</sup> The moderate Islamic typology "*Al-Wasathiyah*"<sup>23</sup> itself is different from the puritans. As explained in the previous paragraph, moderate models of Islam tend to be tolerant, respectful of differences, inclusive, not takfiri, not supremacist and contextualizing in understanding Qur'anic verses.<sup>24</sup>

The emergence of moderate Islam in the Indonesian context cannot be separated from the history of the spread of Islam through the role of Walisongo, who used traditional cultural media in his preaching. Differences in the view of moderate Islam adherents are considered a necessity that must be addressed wisely, and *sunnatullah* is even a blessing in social life.<sup>25</sup> As also expressed by Gus Dur (KH. Abdurrahman Wahid) who also built the idea of Islam that is friendly, cool, loving and

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<sup>20</sup> Nunu Burhanuddin, "Akar dan Motif Fundamentalisme Islam: Reformulasi Tipologi Fundamentalisme dan Prospeknya di Indonesia", *Wawasan: Jurnal Ilmiah Agama dan Sosial Budaya*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Juli 2016, 202.

<sup>21</sup> Saifuddin, "Kekerasan Atas Nama Tuhan: Studi Kasus Kekerasan FPI di Yogyakarta", *In Right: Jurnal Agama dan Hak Asasi Manusia*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011, 79.

<sup>22</sup> Nurul Faiqah, Toni Pransiska, "Radikalisme Islam dan Moderasi Islam: Upaya Membangun Wajah Islam Indonesia yang Damai", *Al-Fikra: Jurnal Ilmiah Kesilaman*, Vol. 17, No. 1, Januari-Juni 2017, 34.

<sup>23</sup> The simple definition of *Wasathiyah* is a good and commendable characteristic that fortifies a person from behavior that leads to extremism. A. Rafiq Zainul Mun'im, *Islam Puritan vs Islam Moderat (Menapak Gagasan Khaled Abou el-Fadl dalam The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam From Extremists)*, *At-Turaz: Jurnal Studi Keislaman*, Vol. 5, No. 2, July-December, 2018, 232.

<sup>24</sup> Iffati Zamimah, "Moderatisme Islam dalam Konteks Keindonesiaan (Studi Penafsiran Islam Moderat M. Quraish Shihab)", *Al-Fanar: Jurnal Ilmu Al-Qur'an dan Tafsir*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Juli 2018, 80.

<sup>25</sup> Asep Abdurrohman, "Eksistensi Islam Moderat dalam Perspektif Islam", *Rusyan Fikir*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Maret 2018, 29.

peaceful. For Gus Dur, the creation of a society that is democratic, fair, tolerant, civilized, and does not discriminate against ethnicity, religion, race or class is the essence of religion. All human beings are equal: no one should be inferior or superior.<sup>26</sup> In his writing, Quraish Shihab states that: "diversity in life is a necessity desired by Allah SWT. This includes differences and diversity of opinion in the scientific field, even the diversity of human responses regarding the truth of the holy books, the interpretation of their contents, and the form of their practice".<sup>27</sup>

### ***Social Media as a Basis for Islamic Contestation in Indonesia***

The development of technology in the current era is a necessity. Especially social media which has become a consumption of modern society. With the existence of social media, interactions between individuals and groups are now easier to participate in, create content, and quickly, such as exchanging messages on WhatsApp and other media channels.<sup>28</sup> Even in a wider scope, social media is now a place to exchange information on all fronts, economy,<sup>29</sup> development, education, even religious interactions are often discussed in it. Starting from the Website, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Youtube channels. However, besides that, not a few social media are used for crimes, ideological wars, radical doctrines, and things that can threaten the state.<sup>30</sup>

Likewise, the opinion of Meike and Young in Nasrullah in defining social media, according to him social media is defined as a convergence between personal / individual communication in the sense of sharing between them / to be shared one-to-one, and is a public media that can be shared with anyone without exception.<sup>31</sup> Research findings show that social media usage has increased by 60%. The Indonesian

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<sup>26</sup> Kunawi Basyir, "Makna Eksoteris dan Esoteris Agama dalam Sikap Keberagamaan Eksklusif dan Inklusif", *Teosofi: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Juni 2018, 234.

<sup>27</sup> M. Quraish Shihab, *Secerab Cahaya Ilahi: Hidup Bersama Al-Qur'an*, (Bandung: Mizan, 2007), 52.

<sup>28</sup> Muhammad Yusi Kamhar, Erma Lestari, "Pemanfaat Sosial Media Youtube Sebagai Media Pembelajaran Bahasa Indoensia di Perguruan Tinggi", *Intelegensi: Jurnal Ilmu Pendidikan*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Juni 2019, 2.

<sup>29</sup> Benedictus A. Simangunsong, "Interaksi Antar manusia Melalui Media Sosial Facebook Mengenai Topik Keagamaan", *Jurnal Aspikom: Asosiasi Pendidikan Tinggi Ilmu Komunikasi*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Juli 2016, 56-66.

<sup>30</sup> Ahmad Setiadi, "Pemanfaatan Media Sosial Untuk Efektifitas Komunikasi", AMIK BSI Karawang, 1.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

Internet Service Providers Association (APIJII) said in the second quarter there was an increase of 25.5 million more internet users in Indonesia in 2020 compared to 2019.<sup>32</sup> The percentage of the Indonesian population using the internet also increased from 2018 to 2022: in 2018, 64.80%; in 2019-2020, 73.70%; and in 2021-2022, 77.02%.<sup>33</sup> Thus, it becomes a challenge for religious people (Islam) in adapting to the progress of the times, especially in socializing.

Various impacts have undeniably often caused unrest among digital media users, such as the rise of threats, hoax news, cyber bullying, and even claiming each other's self-righteousness has often become a hot topic of discussion since the development of social media.<sup>34</sup> For example, radical-conservative groups have thrived in the digital space. This group has been active in cyberspace, especially since the reformation. Radicalism, Islamism and religious conservatism dominate in the virtual media environment, as evidenced by the publication of research findings by Media and Religious Trends in Indonesia in November 2020.

The findings make it clear that conservative narratives dominate (67.2%), then moderate organizations (22.2%), liberal groups (6.1%), and Islamists (4.5%). In addition, from 2009 to 2019, conservative hashtags were frequently used.<sup>35</sup> For example: The legal claim for the use of the veil in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) views the use of the veil as not obligatory (*mubah*) or even that there will be obstacles/disputes.<sup>36</sup> In contrast, Salafis, who rely on the arguments and opinions of their imams, claim that the law of covering the aurat, including the veil, is obligatory

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<sup>32</sup> APJII, "Laporan Survey Internet Asosiasi Penyelenggara Jasa Internet Indonesia (APJII) (Q2) Tahun 2019-2020", *Indonesia Survey Center*, <https://apjii.or.id/survei>.

<sup>33</sup> APJII, "Laporan Survey Internet Asosiasi Penyelenggara Jasa Internet Indonesia (APJII) (Q1) Tahun 2021-2022", *Indonesia Survey Center*, <https://apjii.or.id/survei>.

<sup>34</sup> Muhd Imran Abd Razak, dkk, "Analysis of Extreme Religion Followers and Sosial Media in Malaysia", *Asian Journal of Environment, History dan Heritage*, vol. 2, no. 1, Juni 2018, 94.

<sup>35</sup> The Jakarta Post, "Religious Conservative Narrative Dominates Social Media Space in Indonesia", (November 2020), <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/11/16/religious-conservative-narrative-dominates-social-media-spaces-in-indonesia.html>,

<sup>36</sup> Siti Nursyifa' Fauziah, "Pendapat Ulama NU tentang Cadar Perspektif Safinat al-Najah", (Skripsi—Insitut Agama Islam Ponorogo, 2020), 55-56.

because it is considered a means of covering women's private parts, following the Prophet, comfort, and self-protection.<sup>37</sup>

In this theme, social media is often used as a field to convince people in terms of politics, especially by carrying religious names or symbols, or even ulama (influential people in guiding hearts among Muslims). For example, during the 2019 presidential election. At that time, candidate Joko Widodo carried the name KH Ma'ruf Amin as a candidate for vice president.<sup>38</sup> The appearance of KH Ma'ruf Amin's name in the political space has the potential to lead to the politicization of religion and the politicization of ulama. Another case related to the politicization of ulama also occurred in Pasuruan, East Java, Kiai Silo's perspective in the 2019 presidential election.<sup>39</sup> Likewise, in the 2018 Probolinggo city Pilwali, Habib Hadi Zainal Abidin came out as the winner in the political competition.<sup>40</sup>

The Internet as a platform, allows the exchange and creation of user generated content expressed by Andreas Kaplan and Michael Maenlein (2010), it seems that here opinions from different points of view from various political supporters of some parties easily claim themselves the most correct, by carrying religion.<sup>41</sup> It is not uncommon for fellow Muslims on social media to claim to be the most righteous,<sup>42</sup> which on average is dominated by puritan groups. Both in the form of audio, text / writing, video and even religious symbols / religious language (Islam),<sup>43</sup> even problems

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<sup>37</sup> Prima Ayu Rizqi Mahanani, "Praktik Konsumsi Jilbab Syar'I dan Cadar di Kalangan Perempuan Salafi dalam Perspektif Budaya Konsumen", *Sosial: Jurnal Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial*, vol. 20, no. 2, September 2019, 91.

<sup>38</sup> Prinisia Nurul Ekasari, Anisa Setya Arifina, "Framing Joko Widodo dan Prabowo Subianto di Harian Kompas dalam Pemilihan Presiden 2019", *Jurnal Komunikasi dan Kajian Media*, Vol. 4, No. 1, April 2020, 75.

<sup>39</sup> Miftahul Huda, M. Dayat, "Politisasi Ulama pada Pilpres 2019 Perspektif Kiai Silo di Kabupaten Pasuruan", *Kabilah, Journal of Society Community*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Juni 2019, 54.

<sup>40</sup> Husni Mubaroq, "Analisis Strategi Pemenangan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa dalam Pemilihan Walikota dan Wakil Walikota Probolinggo Tahun 2018", *Publicio: Jurnal Ilmiah Politik, Kebijakan dan Sosial*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2020, 14.

<sup>41</sup> Eko Harry Susanto, "Media Sosial Sebagai Pendukung Jaringan Komunikasi Politik", *Jurnal Aspikom: Asosiasi Pendidikan Tinggi Ilmu Komunikasi*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Juli, 2017, 391-392.

<sup>42</sup> Dian Junita Ningrum, "Kajian Ujaran Kebencian di Media Sosial", *Jurnal Ilmiah Korpus*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Desember 2018, 243.

<sup>43</sup> Rulli Nasrullah, Dudi Rustandi, "Meme dan Islam: Simulakra Bahasa Agama di Media Sosial", *Ilmu Dakwah: Academic Journal for Homiletic Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, Juni 2016, 117.

in addressing politics spread on social media channels.<sup>44</sup> However, in terms of politics, groups on the one hand that tend to be democratic and even moderate have their own claims in responding to elections ahead of politics, such as the 2019 presidential election. As Ma'ruf Amin mentioned that at that time it was not only a political war, but also a moderate-radical ideological war. Then Ma'ruf said to vote for him and asked for prayers to win the election and promised to protect the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>45</sup> NU views purists who are synonymous with violence, coercion, and supremacy as Salafists above as follows: "*Mereka yang mengatasnamakan Islam tapi melakukan fitnah, perusakan dan tindakan terror, sejatinya telah berlaku anti Islam* / Those who act in the name of Islam but carry out slander, destruction and acts of terror, have actually acted anti-Islam", (quotes KH. Miftachul Akhyar, Rais Aam PBNU in the @nahdlatululama Instagram account post).<sup>46</sup>

### ***The Struggle for the Meaning of the State by Extreme vs Moderate Groups***

Entering 1999 after the reformation, politics in Indonesia experienced a development marked by the emergence of Nationalist parties. In that era, right-wing and left-wing Islamic parties began to emerge - popularly known as political Islam and political Islam. The character of political Islam is more inclined to the movement to establish a caliphate-based Islamic Sharia state in Indonesia. With its efforts to demand that the Indonesian State be closer to Islamic Sharia, this has become a hidden mission in the dynamics of politics in Indonesia. Of course, the doctrine of jihad and the establishment of an Islamic state are jargon that is widely voiced in order to seize anything from people who are considered infidels and the like.

The group (Political Islam) in the Indonesian frame is represented by the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). As well as the emergence of a new term at that time, namely "Political

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<sup>44</sup> Ahsani Taqwim Aminuddin, "Instagram: Frame of Qur'an Desecration Cas On Social Media", *Jurnal The Messenger*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Juli 2017, 163.

<sup>45</sup> Merdeka.com, "Ma'ruf Amin: Pilpres 2019 Perang Ideologi kelompok Moderat dan Radikal", <https://www.merdeka.com/politik/maruf-amin-pilpres-2019-perang-ideologi-kelompok-moderat-dan-radikal.html>, (accessed on December 1, 2023).

<sup>46</sup> Instagram, "Quotes), [https://www.instagram.com/p/B0U12GAIGpI/?utm\\_medium=copy\\_link](https://www.instagram.com/p/B0U12GAIGpI/?utm_medium=copy_link), diunggah pada 25 Juli 2019 di akun @nahdlatululama, (accessed on December 1, 2023).

Islam" is something that cannot be separated from the groups as above, namely those that use various religious symbols (Islam) in achieving their interests. For example, those who act in the name of Islam or *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*, but their actions are violent, destructive, and do not reflect Islam to people who are considered heretics, places of sin and the like, such as the Front Pembela Islam (FPI).

However, this decade, Yaqut Cholil Qoumas as Minister of Religious Affairs gave a speech in an online discussion entitled "Understanding Indonesian Muslims Culture" which was held on Saturday, March 13, 2021. In general, Indonesian Muslims consider that the position of religion is very important to their lives. The Minister of Religion referred to a survey conducted in 2020. The survey said that as many as 98 percent of Muslims in Indonesia thought that religion was important to their lives. According to Yaqut, this figure is higher than countries in the Middle East. He further explained that Muslims in Indonesia hold moderate views and agree with the ideology of Pancasila. It is proven that 81.6 percent of Indonesian Muslims agree with Pancasila. Will this data be able to answer the problems of this article? Will it be the opposite? Polarization of the meaning of the state in the digital space occurs as technology develops, from 2014 to 2019, echoes of claims to the truth of the state system are voiced by certain religious groups.

As has happened so far, the struggle over the meaning of the state *Dar al-islam* and *Dar al-salam* from the Salafi group (which tends to be classified as puritanical, textualist, takfiri) and NU-Muhammadiyah (which tends to be moderate, peaceful). To dissect a discourse on social media, Teun A. Van Dijk suggests at least three basic components that can be used, including; text, social cognition and social context:

### 1. Teks Analysis

As of late, there has been a struggle over the meaning of Islam on social media in the political context, which in this theme is represented by Salafi groups (which tend to be classified as puritanical, textualist, *takfiri*) and NU-Muhammadiyah (which tend to be moderate, peaceful). The data that will be presented this time is taken from several online/social media channels, including: websites, Instagram and Twitter that are often consumed by the Indonesian people. Religious politicization also seems to

be still lingering until now. Starting in 2017, religious politicization continued in 2019,<sup>47</sup> and most likely in the following years, both presidential and legislative elections.<sup>48</sup> On April 17, 2019 at polling station 13 located in Tengah village, Cileungsi, Bogor regency, adjacent to Radio Rodja which is a media / dakwah facility owned by Salafi. They did not like it when the name of the Jokowi-Amin candidate was mentioned, and tended to be pro Prabowo-Sandi, the result was that in the polling station the candidate no. 2 won.<sup>49</sup> Likewise, NU, which also contributed greatly to the last presidential election, even called for free choice as stated by KH. Said Aqil Siradj, Chairman of PBNU (12/9/2018).<sup>50</sup> From here, the participation of Salafi groups in the 2019 presidential election on the one hand indicates that they also support elections/politics.

In other data findings, Salafi groups in this regard argue that they allow the right to vote but prohibit politics, as stated by the fatwa of the Al-Irsyad Sharia Council.<sup>51</sup> However, in general, Salafis in viewing the democratic system are not pro/agree, or even considered infidels, because it is a Western product. In their view, democracy is considered haram, one of which is caused by the existence of a one man one vote system, the voice of a cleric is as valuable as the voice of an adulterer, the voice of an unschooled person is equivalent to a professor.<sup>52</sup> Another reason is

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<sup>47</sup> In the 2019 general elections, there was a struggle for meaning and even claims apart from groups on behalf of Islamic groups (moderates & purists), there was also a struggle between two camps of political parties on behalf of religion (Islam) and campaigning for policies on the basis of Islamic law and the basis of the state (Pancasila). Azis Anwar Fachrudin, "Ketika Partai-Partai Islam Merebut Pancasila", <https://tirto.id/pemilu-2019-ketika-partai-partai-islam-merebut-pancasila-dgDY>, (accessed on 1 December 2023).

<sup>48</sup> Ghita Intan, "Politisasi Agama Kental Warnai Pemilu 2019", <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/politisasi-agama-kental-warnai-pemilu-2019/4901972.html>, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

<sup>49</sup> Irfan Teguh, "Kisah Kemenangan Prabowo di TPS Pusat Dakwah Salafi Radio Rodja", <https://tirto.id/kisah-kemenangan-prabowo-di-tps-pusat-dakwah-salafi-radio-rodja-dmDH>, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

<sup>50</sup> CNN, "NU Bebaskan Pilihan Pengikut di Pilpres 2019", <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180913024825-32-329791/nu-bebaskan-pilihan-pengikut-di-pilpres-2019>, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

<sup>51</sup> This ambiguity is an impulse that adopts the political style of the Saudi Arabia region which is so feudalistic, centralized in the royal system. That is if the commoners have no access to the highest caste of government.

<sup>52</sup> However, the one man one vote system or suffrage as the times develop is understood by the group on the condition that they have the right to vote but are prohibited from politics.



because of its adoption from the Western world, so the democratic system is claimed as tasyabbuh to the infidels<sup>53</sup>

The Salafi group's response to democracy/politics as in Indonesia is seen as an act of injustice (*dzalim*), and is categorized as a violation of Shari'ah. This is because it is backed by infidels (the West) according to them and is *haram*. Even the arguments they refer to as the true reference, including QS. Al-Qalam: 35-36. Then other religious texts that he quoted were Hadith Buhari (6248) and Muslim (1652): "Do not seek leadership, for it will be a source of humiliation and regret on the Day of Judgment". The Salafi claim above in this case gets a contradictory response/claim from the moderates. As conveyed by KH. Yahya Cholil Staquf or often nicknamed Gus Yahya said that the general election is the momentum of Nahdlatul Ulama in expressing its political aspirations in various regions. This can be implemented by NU residents and become a good mecca in the midst of society. Later it will become evidence to the outside world that Indonesia's democratic system is good, civilized and the pioneer is NU itself.<sup>54</sup> Then in responding to the heat of the 2019 presidential election, moderate Islamic groups represented by NU often urge to conduct istighosah and pray together for the safety of the nation from fragmentation.

Besides being seen as not in line with what the salafussholih did, politics in the Salafi view is considered a vile and hypocritical act. By relying on one of their reference imams, Shaykh Ali Bin Hasan Al-Halaby Al-Atsari As-Salafi, they are increasingly anti-politics in Indonesia. Shaykh Ali urged the followers of the Salafi manhaj to maintain unity and not to enter the political puddle of chameleons. Then Shaykh Al-Albani's statement which is also used as a reference posted on the Salafi website is in line with the previous opinion. He stated that if politics enters into a group of people, there will be a lot of damage to fiqh (madhhab fanatics), because politics is a game aka chameleon. They then refer to one of their imams, Shaykh Muqbil bin Hadi Al-Wadi'i, who states that party fanaticism (*biḥibiyah*) is the ultimate cause of the ignorance of

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<sup>53</sup> Admin, "Menelisik Fatwa Salafi Indonesia Tentang Pemilu: Boleh Gunakan Hak Pilih Tapi Dilarang Berpolitik", <https://cerdaskuliah.com/2018/10/10/menelisik-fatwa-salafi-indonesia-tentang-pemilu-boleh-gunakan-hak-pilih-tapi-dilarang-berpolitik/>, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

<sup>54</sup> Abdul Rahman Ahdori, Abdullah Alawi, "Ini Imbauan PBNU Untuk Nahdliyin Terkait Situasi Nasional Terkini", <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/106687/ini-imbauan-pbnu-untuk-nahdliyin-terkait-situasi-nasional-terkini>, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

Muslims, because they are preoccupied with it and not chosen from useful knowledge.<sup>55</sup> "*Salafi tidak perlu ikut gabung partai politik, rugi! / Salafis don't need to join political parties, loss!*" said Abu Qatadah in a less than one minute video on the official Salafi Instagram account. Politics/democracy, according to them, is not good for him and is seen to cause a lot of harm.<sup>56</sup>

As the previous data states that the victory of candidate one is dominated by the votes of NU residents. Even participating in politics can be an obligatory kifayah which then can also be an obligatory ain because this determines the future of Indonesia, which is not only involved in worldly matters but also in religious matters. For NU moderate Islam, the criteria for leaders who can be the head of state/government consists of several points that are worth choosing, including: fairness, piety and honesty. As NU which believes in moderation (*al-wahsat*) is referred to as the middle way (middle-way or middle-path),<sup>57</sup> as expressed by Ma'ruf Amin as the elected vice president (who is supported by NU/cultural or moderate Islam)<sup>58</sup> will take firm action against anyone who wants to damage the Republic of Indonesia. "*Kami sepakat bahwa kita memang siap untuk membela negara dan bagi kami NKRI final, dan kita tidak akan memberikan toleransi kepada siapa saja yang akan memecah belah bangsa ini / We agree that we are indeed ready to defend the country and for us NKRI is final, and we will not tolerate anyone who will divide this nation.*"<sup>59</sup>

The middle way carried by moderate Islam in the political context above is indeed dynamic, flexible and not rigid. As expressed by several NU figures above, democracy is seen as an arena in choosing leaders who are considered ideal as

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<sup>55</sup> Abu Nafisah Abdurrahman Thayib, "Wahai Salafi, Inginkah Engkau Masuk Kubangan Politik???!!!", <https://almanhaj.or.id/3930-wahai-salafi-inginkah-engkau-masuk-kubangan-politik.html>, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

<sup>56</sup> Instagram, "Salafi Tidak Perlu Ikut Gabung Partai Politik", 2 September 2020 on account @almanhaj.or.id, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

<sup>57</sup> Masdar Hilmy, "Quo-Vadis Islam Moderat Indonesia?: Menimbang Kembali Moderatisme Nahdlatul Ulama dan Muhammadiyah", *Miqot: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman*, Vol. xxxvi, No.2, Juli-Desember 2012, 264.

<sup>58</sup> Nurrochman, "Pilpres 2019 dan Dua Narasi Islam", <https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-4433096/pilpres-2019-dan-dua-narasi-islam>, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

<sup>59</sup> Instagram, "Quote Ma'ruf Amin", [https://www.instagram.com/p/BxV9C6CBWm0/?utm\\_medium=copy\\_link](https://www.instagram.com/p/BxV9C6CBWm0/?utm_medium=copy_link), diunggah pada 12 Mei 2019 di akun @nahdlatululama, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

determinants of the future of the nation (Indonesia). Meanwhile, Salafi-Wahabi with its Islamic texts is still not fully pro-politics, because in other cases it also participates in elections. It is not the Salafi-Wahabis who disagree with political-democracy in Indonesia, even more extreme against this is the Liberation Student Movement/*Gerakan Mahasiswa* (GM) which firmly wants to establish a khilafah state system in Indonesia. As in the following example: "*Mahasiswa/Pemuda Adalah Penggerak Perubahan Menuju Sebuah Kehidupan Mulia Dengan Syari'ah & Khilafah / Students/Youth are the Drivers of Change Towards a Noble Life with Shari'ah & Khilafah*", Suro Kunto B (Chairman of the SPBROS Labor Union).<sup>60</sup> "*Tegakkan hukum Allah dimanapun kita berada dan bersama siapapun kita / Uphold the law of Allah wherever we are and whoever we are with*" Haidar Al Furqon (cadre of the Liberation Student Movement (GEMA Pembebasan JATIM)).<sup>61</sup>

Contrary to the moderate Islamic fatwa in response to democracy in Indonesia. In 2019 (April 15), the chairman of the NU (*Pengurus Besar*) appealed to *nahdliyyin* citizens to wisely utilize their voting rights regarding the election of the president and his staff. Kiai Aqil Siradj also suggested choosing prospective leaders whose criteria are prophetic and have the four characteristics of the Prophet: *shiddiq* (honest), *fathanah* (intelligent), *amanah* (trustworthy), *teblih* (conveying). The four criteria above must be owned by a prospective leader. He continued by suggesting to choose a responsible, intelligent and honest leader candidate. "*Boleh kita ringkas (jadi) ideal, di samping adalah memiliki kecerdasan dan tanggungjawab dan kejujuran, di samping berani menyampaikan apa yang ada ke publik / Can we summarize (so) the ideal, in addition to having intelligence and responsibility and honesty, in addition to having the courage to convey what exists to the public,*" said KH. Said Aqil Siraj at the PB Nahdlatul Ulama Building, (2019 ago).<sup>62</sup>

In line with Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah also spoke out on social media on (December 30, 2020), that religious moderation is an effort to build society.

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<sup>60</sup> Instagram, [https://www.instagram.com/p/CL4P3MtBeQb/?utm\\_source=ig\\_web\\_copy\\_link](https://www.instagram.com/p/CL4P3MtBeQb/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link), diunggah pada 1 Maret 2021 di akun @gemapembebasanjatim, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

<sup>61</sup> Instagram, [https://www.instagram.com/p/CIzSAu3hYxZ/?utm\\_source=ig\\_web\\_copy\\_link](https://www.instagram.com/p/CIzSAu3hYxZ/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link), diunggah pada 5 desember 2020 di akun @gemapembebasanjatim, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

<sup>62</sup> Hasanul Rizka, "Anjuran PBNU Tentang Memilih Kandidat di Pemilu", <https://republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/19/04/15/ppzyav458-anjuran-pbnu-tentang-memilih-kandidat-di-pemilu>, dipublikasikan pada 15 April 2019, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

Chairman of PP Muhammadiyah Haedar Nashir also explained that what shaped Indonesia was the process of implementing extraordinary religious moderation.<sup>63</sup> In the political contestation in each year that carries the name of religion as a brand or narrative that utilizes Islam (religion), as Gunawan Budiyo (Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta (UMY) Rector) stated "*dengan moderasi bisa memperkuat nilai-nilai keindonesiaan dan tali kebangsaan / moderation can strengthen kindonesiaan values and the rope of nationality*".<sup>64</sup> This means that moderate Islam, which is far from understanding and acts of violence according to Muhammadiyah and NU, is able to create a safe democratic system, without violence and conflict in forming a safe Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

Then, moderate Islam wisely responded to this on social media, represented by two major Indonesian Islamic organizations, NU-Muhammadiyah, which also became the public spotlight. The reason is the pro-democracy / direct presidential election according to the individual rights of the state. PBNU itself states that the election is a legal mechanism of religious and state law. Likewise, Muhammadiyah stated that religious moderation in democracy forms Indonesia into a great foundation in preventing Indonesia from violence. From here it seems that religious truth claims in the context of politics in Indonesia are an interesting conversation to keep updated.

It is not only about religion being used as a mount in voicing its politics that is interesting to listen to, but the truth claims of moderate and puritan Islam in this case are important to know both past, present and future. Ahead of the 2024 elections, it seems that efforts to claim the right thing in politics, especially in Indonesia, will compete again starting from lately (on social media), especially purists who are extreme in rejecting politics-democracy in Indonesia. Likewise, moderate groups who have a full mission to balance it in the same space in maintaining the peace and unity of the Republic of Indonesia.

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<sup>63</sup> Nurhadi Sucahyo, "Refleksi Akhir Tahun Muhammadiyah: Sikap Moderat Membentuk Indonesia", <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/refleksi-akhir-tahun-muhammadiyah-sikap-moderat-membentuk-indonesia-/5718432.html>, (Accessed on 1 December 2023).

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

## 2. Social Cognition

In the social cognition element, namely how the socio-cognitive approach of a text writer (discourse). As observed by the author from the websites [almanhaj.or.id](http://almanhaj.or.id), [@almanhaj.or.id](https://www.instagram.com/almanhaj.or.id), [@gemapembebasanjatim](https://www.instagram.com/gemapembebasanjatim), [@gp\\_kalbar](https://www.instagram.com/gp_kalbar), [@gema\\_uinjakarta](https://www.instagram.com/gema_uinjakarta), [@gpyogykarta](https://www.instagram.com/gpyogykarta), which represent extreme Islamic groups in Indonesia. Judging from the background of its teachings, the [almanhaj.or.id](http://almanhaj.or.id) website and Instagram are based on the salaf manhaj which is identically called the Salafi-Wahabi sect. It is evident from several posts on the website that it is against democracy, textualist relying on Islamic texts (all posts), as well as on Instagram posts, the majority of which are filled with Ustadz Yazid Jawwaz's da'wah studies which are known to be so harsh, takfiri, and supremacist.

Likewise, from the echoes of liberation in several Instagram accounts, in terms of social background, it is also not far from the Salafi sect, even more extreme they openly voice the formation of a caliphate state and disagree with democracy (elections). This is evidenced by the existence of posts in the form of captions and pictures of the flag of the creed "*Laa Ilaaha Illallah*", which is also synonymous with religious movements that do not agree with the decisions of the Indonesian government, even fairly harsh, like the Islamic Defenders Front until now it is an open secret.

Similarly, the analysis on Nahdlatul Ulama accounts [www.nu.or.id](http://www.nu.or.id), [@nahdlatul.ulama](https://www.instagram.com/nahdlatul.ulama), [@ulama.nusantara](https://www.instagram.com/ulama.nusantara). A text appears according to the mental state and background of a writer as in this research. Instagram social media accounts and websites as above cannot be denied that Nahdlatul Ulama as revealed by Tuti Munfaridah in her research results that they are one of the largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia that carries a moderate understanding of religion, is dynamic, inclusive, friendly, contextualist, pluralist, humanist and loves the homeland.<sup>65</sup> Therefore, the text displayed from the author's background is more inclined to agree with the democratic system in Indonesia and contrary to extreme Islamic groups that are so ambitious to establish an Islamic state.

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<sup>65</sup> Tuti Munfaridah, "Islam Nusantara Sebagai Manifestasi Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) dalam Mewujudkan Perdamaian", *Jurnal Walisongo*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (April 2017), 19-34.

### 3. Social Context

This analysis is associated with knowledge and social structures as they develop in society, so that from here it can answer how the responses of Extreme and Moderate Islamic groups in responding to electoral politics (democracy) especially ahead of elections in Indonesia. In the realm of social context elements, it is also how a discourse develops in society. Departing from the discourse on democracy, especially ahead of elections on social media as discussed above, within the scope of Indonesian society, especially Muslims, there are several conflicting opinions. The first is those who are against the democratic system, the second is the camp that agrees with the existence of a democratic system in Indonesia. Regarding the response of Extreme and Moderate Islamic groups on social media, it is necessary to know how the community responds on social media as well, which in this research is evidenced by comments. As the characteristics of extreme Islamic groups such as Salafi-Wahabi and Gema Pembebasan are exclusive and closed, so too can be seen from their closed websites and Instagram accounts, namely by disabling public comments on their posts.

Thus, researchers have not been able to trace the comments of the discourse that developed in the community, because it is doctrinaire without any discussion in the comments column, or even support for the post. In fact, it is inversely proportional to the social media accounts of the website ([www.nu.or.id](http://www.nu.or.id)) and Instagram (@[ulama.nusantara](https://www.instagram.com/ulama.nusantara), @[nahdlatul.ulama](https://www.instagram.com/nahdlatul.ulama)) of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which is a Moderate Islamic group in Indonesia. NU is more open to the social media user community. This is evidenced by the active account/website without an account lock and the activation of the comment column for anyone. So by analyzing the development of this discourse, we will find out how the public responds to the discourse carried by NU in responding to democracy, especially before the election. As is the case in the following comment column:

*"Sing penting ojo golput / yang penting jangan golput"* @[dafiq\\_roosevelt](https://www.instagram.com/dafiq_roosevelt) commented on @[ulama.nusantara](https://www.instagram.com/ulama.nusantara)'s post titled *"Memilih Presiden itu Seperti Memilih Suami/Istri / Choosing a President is Like Choosing a Husband/Wife"*.

"Amazing... It's real moderate. May Allah bless us, Indonesia" @[nadiakhusaniah](https://www.instagram.com/nadiakhusaniah) commented on @[ulama.nusantara](https://www.instagram.com/ulama.nusantara)'s post titled *"Pesan Cak Nun Terkait Pilpres"*. "Nice" comment/response by @[sinta\\_prasinta](https://www.instagram.com/sinta_prasinta), @[aisch\\_](https://www.instagram.com/aisch_) on the same account and post.

"*Saya seneng liat postingan mimin. Suatu hal yang adem. Jangan pernah stop untuk share yang adem-adem gini yah min, / I'm happy to see the post admin. Something cool. Don't ever stop to share something cool like this, min*" Comment by @sunjayanico.

"*Sayangnya ada yang suka nge-boax, ngefitnah, dll... itu yang saya tidak suka / Unfortunately there are those who like to hoax, slander etc... that's what I don't like*" commented @jepta-ms.

"*Saya siap bela negara bila kaum keturunan berjenggot merusak keutuhan negara ini / I am ready to defend the country if the bearded descendants damage the integrity of this country*" @suyud\_this\_is\_joker

"*Yok bersatu.... Untuk saling berbagi dan melengkapi... NKRI tercinta.... Semoga bawaslu dan KPU dapat menyelesaikan perbitungan pemilu dengan amanah jujur dan adil... Megera menyelesaikan permasalahan yg ada dengan amanah dan adil agar hasil penuh keberkahan dan menentramkan / Come on unite.... To share and complete each other ... NKRI beloved.... Hopefully Bawaslu and KPU can complete the election count with honest and fair trust... Megera resolves existing problems safely and fairly so that the results are full of blessings and reassuring.*" @nurulhidayahrepresentative

Some of the comments above show agreement and agreement with the existence of democracy which is marked by elections. With the existence of peaceful messages even in the momentum of 2019, at least it still leaves the struggle and claim of the most correct meaning of Islam between the two camps in responding to the democratic system. Thus, the openness and agreement of Muslims affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama regarding democracy-elections in Indonesia in this discourse analysis can be proven by some of the comments above.

The polarization of the meaning of the state by Nahdlatul Ulama-Muhammadiyah and Salafi-Wahabi-HTI has each argument. The moderate NU-Muhammadiyah stands on contextual religion in religion, which views the ideal state in accordance with Islam is a system that leads to benefits for many parties regardless of race, ethnicity, and religion. The state is seen as a common home that must create an atmosphere of security, prosperity and harmony for its people, of course by continuing to adopt noble Islamic values. Meanwhile, conservative-radicalist groups such as Salafi-Wahabi-HTI are more inclined to understand religion textually and view the ideal state system is to enforce Islamic sharia ala Rasulullah and establish a khilafah system or Islamic state. The two poles of the big house of views on the state system above are experiencing extraordinary contestation in the digital space to influence each other's ideology. Until finally the two poles are known as *Dar al-salam* (a prosperous

country, full of safety and tranquility) and *Dar al-islam* (a country based on Islamic sharia / caliphate).

## CONCLUSION

Based on the results of this study, researchers can conclude that the struggle over the meaning of "state" by Nahdlatul Ulama-Muhammadiyah and Salafi-Wahabi-HTI on social media has two major concepts that become their identity, namely *Dar al-salam* and *Dar al-islam*. From here, the state ideology movement of moderate groups is more dominant in the contextualization aspects of Islamic teachings in various lines of life, including the state system, which then supports the existence of a democratic system in Indonesia. Nahdlatul Ulama-Muhammadiyah tend to be dynamic in following the times while still not forgetting the basic aspects of Islamic teachings that are reinforced by sacred religious texts. In contrast, the Salafi-Wahabi-HTI organization leans towards the attitude of wanting to enforce Islamic law in accordance with the orders of the Prophet Muhammad Saw. However, in accordance with its textualist character, this group tends to narrow and narrow the interpretation of sacred texts or religious messages in understanding something, until finally the reading of the state system must be based on the system built during the prophetic era or after, namely the khilafah and Islamic sharia, or what is known as *Dar al-islam*.

Through their social media accounts, the two camps have their own basis in expressing their opinions regarding the state system or in responding to democracy in Indonesia. The Salafi-Wahabi-HTI group displays more texts based on arguments that mostly respond to democracy/politics as a chameleon game, dzolim, and infidels for people who apply it because they think it comes from the West. They do not even hesitate to openly echo the khilafah state that is most appropriate to be implemented in Indonesia. In contrast to Nahdlatul Ulama-Muhammadiyah, which is dynamic and humanist, it is more open in viewing the state or democratic system. This is evidenced by posts or captions from older scholars who broadly view the democratic system as the right way to use in choosing leaders, and this does not conflict with Islamic law, this mindset system is then called *Dar al-salam*.



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